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The recent economic and political crisis has been defi ned as 
the present century’s Great Recession (Verick & Islam, 2010). In 
these times of crisis and uncertainty so-called Cycles of Protest 
tend to appear (Tarrow, 1992). In these cycles, new political 
movements also rise from the left and right of the ideological 
political continuum. Some of them demand radical changes in 
politics and society. Radical politics both from the left and right 
wing have recently experienced a rise in popularity  (Mudde, 2014; 
Rooduijn, Burgoon, van Elsas, & van de Werfhorst, 2017). Radical 
politics are defi ned as extreme political movements that want to 
make fundamental changes to the existing order, mainly through 
changing the power and functions of the state (Kurian, 2011). At 
the same time, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, 
radicalism will advocate for extreme measures to retain or change 
a political state of affairs. 
While at times society should be favored by some critical 
changes, and those changes would be benefi cial and provide 
improved life conditions, the extension and generalization of 
extreme practices is problematic. It generates polarization, and 
threatens tolerance, which is one of the most nuclear values of 
democracy (Sullivan & Transue, 1999).  
Multiple factors, both personal and situational, can be 
responsible for such bigoted and imperative attitudes and 
behavior. Yet one that seems to be a key factor is the belief that 
one’s perception of reality is objectively and doubtlessly correct, 
something that resounds with what Ellis (1986) called ‘Absolute 
Truth’.
This introduces the notion of naïve realism, defi ned as the 
tendency to believe that one’s own ideas are an objectively 
truthful representation of the world (Griffi n & Ross, 1991). 
Additionally, naïve realism implies a series of considerations 
about those who disagree with these views. Ward, Ross, Reed, 
Turiel, & Brown (1997) state that, since naïve realism makes 
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Abstract Resumen
Background: Extreme political attitudes have been on the rise since the 
economic and political crisis of 2008. This surge of extremism constitutes a 
real threat, as attitudes like these are dangerous for the peaceful, democratic 
functioning of society. A new cognitive style, Monopoly on Truth has been 
proposed, based mainly on the concept of naïve realism. Method: The 
development and validation of a scale for this new construct is the main 
objective of this study. A pilot study (N=209) was performed in order to 
gather the items that make up the fi nal scale; and a main study (N=369) was 
conducted to test the validity and predictive power of the scale. Results: 
The validation is successful as the scale shows good reliability scores, while 
also proving to be linked to extremism-related constructs. Additionally, the 
scale shows signs of not being ideologically biased. Conclusion: Results 
show the scale to be a very useful tool for studying extremism and other 
political trends. Future directions and other implications of the Monopoly 
on Truth are also discussed.
Keywords: Naïve realism, moral superiority, polarization, political 
extremism.
Desarrollo y validación de la Escala de Monopolio de la Verdad. Una 
medida de extremismo político. Antecedentes: las actitudes políticas 
extremas han experimentado un crecimiento constante desde la crisis 
político-económica de 2008. Esta oleada de extremismo constituye una 
amenaza real, debido el peligro que supone para el funcionamiento pacífi co 
y democrático de la sociedad. Se propone un nuevo estilo cognitivo, el 
Monopolio de la Verdad, basado principalmente en el concepto de realismo 
ingenuo. Método: el desarrollo y validación de una escala para este nuevo 
constructo es el objetivo principal del presente trabajo, para ello se llevó 
a cabo un estudio piloto (N=209) con la fi nalidad de desarrollar la escala, 
así como un estudio principal (N=369) cuyo propósito fue la validación 
de la misma. Resultados: el proceso de construcción y validación fue 
satisfactorio ya que la escala muestra una buena fi abilidad y está vinculada 
con constructos relacionados con extremismo. Adicionalmente, la escala 
no muestra sesgos ideológicos. Conclusiones:  la Escala de Monopolio de 
la Verdad es una herramienta de gran interés para el estudio del extremismo 
y otras tendencias políticas. Se discuten también direcciones futuras y otras 
implicaciones del Monopolio de la Verdad.
Palabras clave: extremismo político, polarización, realismo ingenuo, 
superioridad moral.
Psicothema 2018, Vol. 30, No. 3, 330-336
doi: 10.7334/psicothema2017.423
 
Received: December 4, 2017 • Accepted: March 5, 2018
Corresponding author: Marcos Dono
Facultad de Psicología
Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
15782 Santiago de Compostela (Spain)
e-mail: marcos.dono.martin@usc.es
Development and validation of the Monopoly on Truth Scale. A measure of political extremism
331
people think they interpret reality as it objectively is, everyone 
else should agree with them. If they do not, this may be due to 
three main reasons: a) people have not been exposed to the same 
information I have, b) people may be unable to reach reasonable 
conclusions from objective reality, or are too lazy to do so or 
c) people distort reality based on self-interest or ideological 
claims. 
These consequences derived from the naïve realism bias are 
linked to the emergence of extremist attitudes and polarization. 
Ellis (1986) linked extremist and fanatic behavior with irrational, 
absolute beliefs, that were at the root of intolerance, and Absolute 
Truth was one of them. These irrational beliefs imply absolute 
demands about ourselves and the world, as failure to meet 
those demands will in turn make us unworthy or the situation 
unbearable (Harrington, 2013). This explains the willingness to 
impose one’s ideas by people who hold these absolute beliefs. On 
the other hand, naïve realism will lead to polarization (Ross & 
Ward, 1995) as one of its features is the inability to understand 
that others could have a valid and alternative view of reality based 
on the same information as one does.  It has been observed how 
opposing partisans not only overvalued their rivals’ extremism 
when assessing their attitudes, but also exaggerated their own 
side’s extremism (Keltner & Robinson, 1996). Recognizing this 
bias helps processes of confl ict resolution (Nasie, Bar-Tal, Pliskin, 
Nahhas, & Halperin, 2014). 
Considering the aforementioned, it seems that as a result of 
the unaware and persistent presence of naïve realism, a cognitive 
style could play an important role in the surge and maintenance of 
extremism and polarization.  
This proposed cognitive style, which we label “The Monopoly 
on Truth” has the following main characteristics: the predisposition 
to believe that one’s political ideas are objectively better and 
more valuable for the whole of society; the underestimation of 
alternative ideas and those who hold them, to the point of seeing 
them as rivals; and the willingness to impose those ideas in the 
name of a greater good, where the ends justify the means.
The idea of a cognitive style that may induce extremist political 
attitudes and behavior has been examined in political psychology 
literature for years. The fi rst study is that on authoritarian 
personality by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 
(1950). This work was criticized mainly upon his ideological bias 
(Rokeach & Fruchter, 1956). These critics motivated other authors 
to look for a variable that could explain radical tendencies without 
being biased by ideology (Eysenck, 1951; Rokeach & Fruchter, 
1956). The goal of those works may not have been reached as 
several studies found them to still be ideologically biased (Billig, 
1979; Smithers & Lobley, 1978).
As regards the Monopoly on Truth variable, we fi nd that its 
main theoretical foundation, the naïve realism bias, does not seem 
to  be related to ideology (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995). 
In fact, it has been observed that naïve realism bias plays a role 
in the development of false polarization among both liberal and 
conservative groups (Sherman, Nelson, & Ross, 2003). There 
is reasonable evidence that points towards naïve realism being 
present throughout the ideological spectrum. This will justify the 
claim of Monopoly on Truth, mainly based on the notions of naïve 
realism, also unbiased by ideology. 
Therefore, the main objectives of this work are to develop and 
validate a measure for the Monopoly on Truth and to determine if 
it is indeed not biased by ideology.
PILOT STUDY
Objective
The main goal of this pilot study was to develop a reliable 
measure that tapped the Monopoly on Truth variable.
Method
Participants
Sample comprised two hundred and nine (209) university 
students. One hundred and eighty participants were women 
(86.1%), and the mean age was 21.18. 
Instruments
Three experts developed a total of 30 items, each one 
developing 10. From those 30 initial items 8 were discarded due to 
high resemblance in their phrasing. The remaining 22 items were 
ranked by the experts as a function of their theoretical adequacy 
with the construct. 9 items represented 100% rate of agreement. 
Participants completed this fi rst version of the scale and also 
provided information about age and sex. 
Procedure
Participants were informed of the purpose of their collaboration 
and confi dentiality of data, and then answered the MOTS online 
through Qualtrics software. 
Data analysis
Data analysis was performed using SPSS (v.21) software. The 
fi rst stage of the analysis involved calculating the descriptive 
statistics of the items. Then an Exploratory Factor Analysis [EFA] 
(Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation) and an item 
analysis were performed.  
Results
 
Results are shown in Table 1. The fi nal version of the scale 
was made up of 8 items, one  was deleted to increase scale 
reliability. The scale resulted in two factors, with four items 
each, which were identifi ed as the cognitive (α= .726) and 
behavioral (α= .671) components of the construct; α= .726 for 
the scale as a whole. This reliability is considered adequate 
for this fi rst approach. Moreover, the item-total relation was 
also satisfactory, varying between .458 and .617 in F1 and 
between .386 and .558 in F2. Other than that, the scale had a 
solid theoretical background and both of its dimensions showed 
construct validity.
                      
Discussion
The goal of this preliminary study was to create a reliable 
measure of Monopoly on Truth. The study is believed to be 
successful as the scale showed acceptable reliability and construct 
validity.




The goal is twofold: a) to confi rm the factorial structure of 
MOTS and provide evidence of its validity; and b) to test if this 
new measure is not ideologically biased. To reach them, MOTS and 
other scales were completed (all instruments are described below).
Method
Participants
Sample size was calculated for a population representative of 
Spain for a confi dence level of 95% and a 5% margin of error. 
Three hundred and sixty-nine (369) Spanish participants took part 
in this study. 203 of them were women (55%) and mean age was 
42.80. 
Instruments
Monopoly on truth was measured through the scale developed 
and tested in the pilot study. Reliability increased when compared 
to that of the former study (cognitive factor, α=.83; behavioral 
factor α=.75; total scale α=.76).  The explained variance for both 
factors was 61%. 
Ideology was measured on an 11-point self-placement ideology 
scale, where left was scaled from 0 to 4, right scaled from 6 to 10, 
and 5 represented a centrist ideology.
Egalitarianism, utilitarian individualism and ethnocentrism 
were measured as another way of gauging ideology. The three 
scales from (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2012) showed acceptable 
reliability (α of .83; .76 and .86 respectively).
Underestimation of others and belief in a single truth are sub-
scales of the Dogmatism scale by Rokeach & Fruchter (1956) (α 
of .63 and .70 respectively).
Authoritarianism was measured using an revised measure of 
this construct by Elchardus & Spruyt (2012) (α= .78).
Tolerance. Tolerance was gauged using two different measures. 
The fi rst was taken from (Aymerich, Canales, & Vivanco, 2003), 
and measures intolerance (α= .78). The other tolerance measure 
used is from (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004) (α= .90).
Polarization.  Participants had to indicate their level of proximity 
with a series of political parties, from 0 to 10. Additionally, 
participants were asked about their preferred political option. A 
mean score of the difference between the assessment of the chosen 
party and the others was obtained as a measure of polarization. This 
instrument was inspired by a previous measure (Stroud, 2010). 
Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaires online using 
Qualtrics software.
Data analysis
Data analysis was performed using SPSS (v.21) and Amos 
(v.21) software. Descriptive and correlational analysis, EFA, 
Confi rmatory Factor Analyses (CFA), multiple regressions and 
ANOVA were performed.
Results
Confi rmation of the factorial structure
The data analysis started once again with an EFA that 
replicated the solution obtained in the Pilot Study. After which a 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the items, factor loadings and items analysis
          Items M SD F1 F 2
Corrected item-
total correlation
Alpha if the item 
is deleted
Cognitive factor (α= .726)
3. My ideas are socially much fairer than those of my political adversaries [Mis ideas son socialmente 
mucho más justas que las de mis adversarios políticos]
4.62 1.52 .802 .129 .617 .600
19. If I defend my ideas it is because they are fairer than the rest [Si defi endo mis ideas es porque son 
más justas que el resto]
5.22 1.28 .718 .213 .532 .656
2. What I defend is what is objectively more convenient for the people [Aquello que defi endo es 
objetivamente lo que más le conviene a la gente]
4.71 1.39 .707 .056 .472 .692
4. My ideas defend the wellbeing of everybody not just that of a few people [Mis ideas defi enden el 
bienestar de todos, no de unos pocos]
5.63 1.14 .698 .047 .458 .698
Behavioral factor (α= .671)
8. To defend the interests of the people it is legitimate to resort to the use of force [Para defender los 
intereses de la gente es legítimo recurrir a la fuerza]
2.12 1.47 .088 .791 .558 .539
12. The improvement of society can justify an action otherwise reprehensible [La mejora de la sociedad 
puede justifi car una acción que en otro caso sería reprochable]
3.78 1.54 .007 .739 .456 .602
14. When an idea is objectively good for the whole of society. it is legitimate to impose it even against 
the will of some [Cuando una idea es objetivamente buena para el conjunto de la sociedad, es legítimo 
imponerla, incluso contra la voluntad de unos pocos]
3.54 1.74 .162 .660 .423 .627
16. To pact with our opponents can lead us to failure in the quest for a better society [Pactar con nuestros 
oponentes puede llevarnos a fracasar en la búsqueda de una sociedad mejor]
3.31 1.64 .144 .621 .386 .648
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Confi rmatory Factor Analysis of the MOTS scale was performed 
(see Figure 1).
Model showed a good fi t, despite a signifi cant Chi-square (χ2 
(51) = 80.70, p= .005). According to Ruiz, Pardo, & San Martín, 
(2010) a signifi cant Chi-square calls for the assessment of other 
indicators. Those indicators showed satisfactory fi t of the model 
(GFI= .97; CFI= .98; RMSEA= .05; SRMR = .04).      
Validity evidence based on relationship with other variables
Validity of MOTS scale underwent a series of correlational 
tests. Among the constructs measured in the study, some were 
expected to positively correlate with the MOTS. Confi rmation of 
the hypothesized relation will provide support in terms of validity 
of the scale. The constructs expected to positively correlate with 
the MOTS score were: underestimation of others, belief in a single 
truth and intolerance. Someone with high scores in MOTS has 
diffi culty assuming other possible ways of thinking, and when 
confronted with people that do not share those views will be prone 
to ascribe that person with inability or self-interests. In other 
words, people scoring high in MOTS would only rely on their own 
views, making them more intolerant, and have a negative view of 
those who disagree with them. Results supported the hypothesized 
relation, as MOTS signifi cantly and directly correlated with all 
three constructs (p= <.001) (see Table 2).
The relation between Monopoly on Truth and Authoritarianism 
is a more complex one. Authoritarianism is a previously developed 
“cognitive style” that theoretically measures tendency to manifest 
certain attitudes regardless of ideology, but in the end results in 
a scale biased to the right (Rokeach,1956). In fact, results of the 
present study show correlations between Authoritarianism and 
ideological self-placement, egalitarianism (negative correlation) 
and ethnocentrism (all of them p< .001). However, the constructs of 
Authoritarianism and Monopoly on Truth hold some similarities, 
especially as regards the imposition of certain ideas to the whole of 
society, even if violence is needed to do so. What may be different 
is the reason for that imposition. While authoritarian people 
assume that authority has to be followed at all times, and thus 
people should comply with the rules leaders impose, those with 
high scores in MOTS would show preference for the imposition 
of certain ideas, but on the basis that those ideas are objectively 
correct and better for society. Due to the commonalities between 
the two concepts, a signifi cant correlation is to be expected. 
Nevertheless, said correlation should be small so as to treat them 
as separate constructs. Authoritarianism and MOTS signifi cantly 
correlate, but this correlation is small (r (368)= .166; p= .001), 
hinting there is a solid conceptual difference between them. 
Furthermore, as MOTS positively correlates with intolerance, 
its relationship with a tolerance scale logically works in the 
opposite direction. This is exactly what the results confi rm, as 
MOTS and tolerance correlate negatively and signifi cantly (p< 
.001) (see Table 2).
Finally, another aspect to consider is the predictive power of 



















Figure 1. MOTS Confi rmatory Factor Analysis indices
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a variable that could help explain group polarization, polarization 
was chosen as an appropriate variable to test the MOTS predictive 
validity. Previous to the report of the results of this analysis it has 
to be noted that the sample size was reduced for this procedure. As 
some participants did not satisfactorily complete the polarization 
measure, the sample for the predictive validity test was cut to 334 
participants. A step-wise, linear regression analysis was performed, 
where polarization was the criterion variable, and MOTS, 
egalitarianism, individualism, ethnocentrism, underestimation 
of others, belief in a single truth, authoritarianism, intolerance 
and tolerance as the predictor variables. Results showed that the 
MOTS variable showed a higher Beta score, which points towards 
the MOTS as the best predictor of polarization among the variables 
in the analysis. However, the fi nal model of the linear regression 
offered a fairly low explained variance (see Table 3).
 
Is Monopoly on Truth biased upon ideology? 
One of the main objectives was to prove that MOTS is unbiased 
to ideology. Results supported this idea through several different 
tests. First, the correlation between the MOTS and ideological 
self-placement was non-signifi cant (p= .705). Concurrently, data 
showed that the MOTS neither correlated with Egalitarianism 
(p= .783) nor Ethnocentrism (p= .259), both scales of ideological 
nature that in turn did correlate with ideological self-placement 
(with associated values of p< .001). 
In addition to correlation, independence of MOTS from 
ideology was tested using a factor ANOVA on the MOTS 
scores with ideological self-placement as a factor. A fi rst test 
was performed on three groups: left, including those that scored 
0 to 4 in ideological self-placement; center, those who scored 
5; and right, participants that scored from 6 to 10. Tukey HSD 
comparisons showed no signifi cant differences between left and 
right, but differences between left and center and right and center 
were signifi cant (see Table 4; Figure 2). 
Additionally, another factor ANOVA was performed with 
different groups, this time the sample was divided into extreme left, 
extreme right and non-extremists. The groups were made up based 
on the quartiles in the scores of ideological self-placement scale, 
as the inferior and superior quartiles represented extreme left and 
right respectively. Similarly, in the last ANOVA, results showed 
signifi cant differences between both extremes and the non-extremist 
group; while no signifi cant difference resulted from the comparison 
between extreme left and extreme right (see Table 4, Figure 3). 
 
Discussion
The main goal of this work was to develop and validate a 
measure of Monopoly on Truth, a cognitive style variable that 
could infl uence political attitudes and behavior while not being 
biased with the subjects’ ideology. The proposed variable has a 
Table 2
MOTS correlation tests
Underestimation of others Belief in a single Truth Intolerance Authoritarianism Tolerance
Monopoly on Truth .33** .24** .39** .16* -.25**
** p<.001, * p <.05
Table 3
Regression model for polarization
B Std. Error β t p
Monopoly on Truth .45 .09 .26 4.97 <.001
Individualism -.35 .08 -.25 -4.22 <.001
Authoritarianism .16 .06 .15 2.48 .013
















Ideology Center vs. Ideology Left -.47* .16  -.85 -.09
Ideology Center vs. Ideology Right -.71*        .17  -1.11 -.30
Ideology Left vs. Ideology Right -.23 .11 -.49 .02
F(2, 366)= 8.70; η2= .04
No extremism vs. Extremism Left -.71* .12 -1 -.42
No extremism vs. Extremism Right -.59* .11 -.87 -.32
Extremism Left vs. Extremism Right .11 .14 -.21 .44
F(2,366)= 23.29; η2= .11

















Figure 2. ANOVA for the scores of MOTS with ideology as factor
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solid theoretical background and the resulting scale showed good 
indicators in reliability and its relation with related constructs point 
towards its validity. At the same time, results showed that MOTS 
is unbiased by ideology in a number of different tests. This is a key 
circumstance as the MOTS could help to better understand some 
of the behavioral commonalities between people on the left and 
right of the ideological spectrum. It also allows for an explanation 
of the polarization process regardless of its ideological nature, 
which could in turn help explain extremism or radicalism. 
The fact that ‘centrists’ showed lower scores in the MOTS 
when compared to leftists and rightists may have to do with their 
natural approach to politics. Lakoff defi nes them as biconceptuals 
(Lakoff, 2014), this is, people that share values typical of the left 
and the right depending on the issue they evaluate. This may be an 
advantage regarding the ability to take others’ differing opinions 
into account, which leads to a lower MOTS score.
The hypothesized relation between MOTS and extremism 
was also confi rmed through the different statistical analyses. As 
MOTS correlates with underestimation of others and intolerance 
positively and with tolerance negatively; it also predicted 
polarization. Although the effect size of these results is not great, 
it has to be noted that the measures used are sensitive to social 
desirability, and it is diffi cult to measure these constructs while 
completely eliminating this issue. We are aware that this is a slight 
limitation of this work, but the fact that the MOTS signifi cantly 
correlates and predicts these variables regardless of this obstacle 
also speaks about its effi cacy as a measure. Another phenomenon 
MOTS could help explain is the rise of populism (Kriesi, 2014; 
Mudde, 2004). Populism is defi ned by Mudde as “an ideology that 
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous 
and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt 
elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of 
the general will of the people” (Mudde, 2004, pp.543). The fact 
that it is based on a confrontation between two groups, where the 
ingroup is good and the outgroup bad as an intrinsic characteristic, 
clearly resounds with the ideas behind the MOTS. 
Also, the rise of populism and extremism seem to be related, as 
several studies claim, particularly in the case of the right-wing, but 
also the left-wing (Mudde, 2014; Rooduijn et al., 2017; Rydgren, 
2010). This opens up an exciting, new route of study, with the goal 
of determining the interplay between all these variables.
An interesting refl ection about the MOTS has to do with its 
implicit moral character. Moral variables have recently been 
used in the study of political behavior, with encouraging results 
(Skitka & Morgan, 2014; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). In the MOTS, 
one’s ideas are expressed to be better for the whole of society, 
progress and the wellbeing of people. In this sense, people who 
try to impose those ideas could be conceived as a moral example 
(Walker & Hennig, 2004).
This moral dimension of MOTS is a characteristic that could 
be very valuable in the study of extremism or radicalization. The 
moral system of beliefs is one effi cient way of justifying extremist 
behavior and rule-breaking in general (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, 
& Haidt, 2012). Harrington (2013) proposes a link between socio-
political extremism and utopian beliefs about the perfectibility of 
man and society, also related to the will of imposing one’s ideas 
for the benefi t of society, a tendency assessed in the MOTS. 
Overall, the MOTS represents an exciting prospect that opens 
up new routes of research regarding political behavior and could 
even help understand political processes of great importance 
nowadays, such as polarization, extremism and populism.
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Figure 3. ANOVA for the scores of MOTS with extremism as factor
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